EXHIBIT A

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH
GMAC, A DELAWARE) CORPORATION,)
) Cause No. 08-2-10683-5 Plaintiff,)
vs. {
EVERETT CHEVROLET, INC., A) DELAWARE CORPORATION.)
Et al.
Defendants.
VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
BE IT REMEMBERED that on 11th day of April, 2009,
the above-entitled and numbered cause came on for
Hearing before JUDGE ERIC Z. LUCAS, Snohomish County
Superior Court, Everett, Washington.
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff JOHN GLOWNEY
For the Defendant WILLIAM WHEELER and KARL HAUSMANN

REPORTED BY:
DIANA NISHIMOTO, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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CSR. 3222

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1 THE COURT: All right. We are back on the record 2 in the matter of GMAC versus Everett Chevrolet. And 3 this morning's hearing was scheduled to talk about the 4 motion to amend the complaint. I've sort of changed 5 I'm going to give you my ruling. So this agenda. 6 here we go. 7 This matter has come before the Court for hearing from March 17th, 2009 to April 10th, 2009. The Court 8 has heard and reviewed trial testimony, all exhibits, 9 the memorandum of counsel, the records and the files 10 It is therefore ordered, adjudged and 11 herein. 12 decreed as follows: 13 And these are my Findings of Fact. 14 Owner, John Reggans, has been operating Everett 15 Chevrolet Inc. (Henceforth ECI) successfully in the 16 City of Everett since 1996. He started in this 17 business with an 80 percent investment from Motor's Holding, a division of General Motors Company and a 18 19 twenty percent match of his own. The program he engaged in with Motor's Holding 20 enabled the junior investor to buy out the larger 21 22 company interest in a certain amount of time. 23 The pro forma plan for Mr. Reggans was to 24 accomplish this task in 3.5 years. His actual 25 performance was better. He acquired one hundred

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1 percent ownership in 1999, after only two years and 2 nine months. This acquisition was achieved solely 3 through dealer profits. ECI, under Mr. Reggans, has been profitable every 4 5 year from 1996 to 2006. The Dunn and Bradstreet report filed as exhibit number 92 indicates that his 6 7 high year sales were approximately 40 million dollars. During the late 90's Mr. Reggans testified that he 8 9 averaged new car sales of 70 a month from 1996 to 1999. In 1999, a new Chevy dealership, Speedway 10 11 Chevrolet, opened up as a direct competitor. After 12 this, his new car sales dropped, but he still managed 13 to average about 40 to 60 new cars sold a month. In 1999, he received a working capital loan from 14 GMAC in the amount of \$500,000, and repaid it in full 15 in five years. He has had revolving line of credit 16 with GMAC since 1999, with payment terms of interest 17 18 only. This continued until July 2008, when GMAC 19 unilaterally demanded principal reduction payments of 20 \$10,000 a month in addition to interest. 21 Mr. Reggans testified that in 2006 ECI earned 22 \$700,000 in net profit. However, after 2006, the car 23 industry began to decline. His 2007 net profit was 24 only about \$28,000. In September of 2007, Mr. Jerry Vick became GMAC 25

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1 branch manager for the Pacific Northwest. Vick was asked on direct examination if there were any 2 credit issues in 2007, he indicated, yes, that ECI 3 needed to expand its revolving line of credit from 4 5 \$500,000 to \$800,000. 6 The request was made directly between Mr. Reggans 7 and Mr. Vick. There was no problem granting this 8 request at that time. At the end of 2007, Mr. 9 Reggans also requested of Mr. Vick that GMAC help 10 finance the purchase of real estate the firm was 11 leasing. Mr. Reggans saw this as critical to the profitability of his business because he was facing a 12 dramatic increase in lease payments and this was a 13 14 proactive action on his part. 15 The purchase of the property would avoid an 16 escalation in lease payments of nearly fifty percent. 17 Mr. Reggans made clear that this deal had to close by 18 GMAC did not respond until May December 31st, 2007. 19 of 2008. The response was a decline and was verbally 20 delivered by Mr. Vick. GMAC did not respond to this 21 request in writing. 22 On direct examination, Mr. Vick indicated that the reason for the decline was no positive cash flow. 23 However, the April financial statement loss was the 24 first quarter loss of the year. 25 Plus GMAC had just

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increased the revolving line of credit.

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Lastly, the collateral is extremely valuable real estate on Highway 99, Evergreen Way in Everett. The property was appraised. The unrebutted testimony is that the sales price was one million dollars under the appraisal, as such, the Court does not find Mr. Vick's answer at trial to be credible.

From a business standpoint, GMAC's position is not reasonable. From the facts presented, GMAC appears to have been dragging its feet. This delay, rather than swift rejection, denies the dealer the opportunity to pursue other options in a timely manner. As an isolated occurrence, this fact is not important. But it is important if it is a pattern of behavior.

The April ECI financial statement showed a year to date loss of \$163,042. This led to a meeting between Mr. Vick and Mr. Reggans on June 10th. Mr. Vick testified that the meeting basically covered all the items later memorialized in his letter of July 31st, 2008, which is exhibit number 1. Mr. Reggans disputed this vehemently in his testimony, indicating that the meeting was dominated by a request for his personal guarantee and that virtually none of the other topics in Mr. Vick's subsequent letter were communicated in

this meeting. This raises a very serious issue of 1 2 credibility. 3 In his court testimony, Mr. Vick indicated that he could not recall Mr. Reggans' response to raising 4 5 these very serious issues, particularly to the request for the \$800,000 cash injection. The Court finds that 6 Mr. Vick's testimony is simply not credible. 7 In the letter, Mr. Vick indicates that because of 8 the losses, ECI will need a cash injection of 9 10 \$800,000, Mr. Reggans's personal guarantee and continue to pay promptly and faithfully. A deadline 11 was set at October 31st, 2008 to achieve these goals 12 and if that they were not achieved, GMAC promised to 13 "suspend or terminate" the dealer's wholesale credit 14 lines. After these conditions were set, a few more 15 were added. 16 One was a charge of \$500 per audit. 17 18 And number two was the change in the revolving line of credit setting a principal reduction payment of 19 \$10,000 a month. 20 This letter is copied to Michelle Smith and her 21 only. The Court also finds it incredible that a 22 letter of this magnitude would be sent almost fifty 23 days after the meeting. 24 In the world of finance, sixty days is a lifetime. 25

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A concerned dealer would certainly want these fifty days in order to meet the conditions set. Here, GMAC deprived the Dealer of his time to adjust, another indication of delay.

By his own testimony, Mr. Vick did not mention the deadline in his meeting, only in the letter. The entire scenario, as a reported by Mr. Vick, lacks credibility.

This letter has been construed in many different ways, but in business this is known as a drop dead letter. The author is communicating to the reader that the relationship is over and it is just a matter of time before the end. However, this letter attempts to mask this intent by justifying GMAC's actions based on credit trends and performance. But at this point in the year, there were no trends as All high overhead businesses show losses at the beginning of the year until they reached their break even point in sales later in the year. This is common knowledge. If this had been the subject of oral conversation over lunch, there is no question, in this Court's view, given Mr. Reggans' wide ranging contacts, that he would have had a different posture.

But GMAC deprived him of the opportunity to make the maximum use of his time by misleading him, by

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1 manipulating and withholding information and resting Page 7

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on a reservation of its rights. This fifty days becomes a critical point later in the year.

what Mr. Reggans did not know is that GMAC was undertaking a very sophisticated financial analysis on his firm. He did not know that a metric was being applied to him. Ms. Smith testified that he needed to show a debt to equity ratio of three to one, yet this was never told to him, even though GMAC knew they had analyzed his April debt to equity ratio at over 9.73 to 1. There was no proof by GMAC that the cash injection of \$800,000 was based on achieving this three to one debt to equity ratio.

And in fact, Ms. Smith testified that she knew he could not make this target in July because he had continued to lose money. When Mr. Reggans did inject \$500,000 into his business in October hoping this would convince GMAC to lift the personal guarantee condition, he still could only achieve a debt to equity ratio of 18 to 1.

On questioning by the Court, Ms. Smith admitted that the target cash injection of \$800,000 was no longer valid in July when it was requested in writing. And they did not tell him it was no longer valid. She calculated that a total cash injection of \$800,000 by

the October deadline, given the increased losses,

would only get him to a debt to equity ratio of 10.73 Page 8

3 to 1, when the metric is 3 to 1. She knew that ECI 4 could not meet GMAC goals. According to GMAC, both Mr. Vick and Ms. Smith 5 engaged in detailed financial discussions with Mr. 6 7 Reggans about the performance of his business, yet not 8 once did they share the financial analysis with him. Targets were set without any justification. 9 10 Deadlines were set without any notice or 11 justification. When he inquired why he was asked for 12 his personal guarantee after 12 years of doing business with GMAC, he was told vaguely that it was 13 not uncommon. That was a quote, not uncommon, and 14 15 that "not every dealer" had to do it. 16 Ms. Smith was also not a credible witness. By her own testimony she has 25 years in the business and a 17 Masters in business administration. 18 Yet she could not derive the formulas from simply reviewing the 19 financial information on instruments she has 20 21 purportedly used for years. She could not glean the formulas without a formula handbook or a cheat sheet 22 and she could not give the Court ECI's breakeven point 23 24 in total sales, only in units per month. For a high

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1	However, it is credible if her primary job is
2	collections and shutting down companies. This does
3	not require a high level financial analysis. And she

level unit manager, this is simply not credible.

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testified that she was just "promoted" to high risk manager. This is a credit collection term. In other businesses it's called special credits. This is a division of a firm that a client goes to when all credit is about to be cancelled and all debts called due.

Proof of this collection attitude is her response to Mr. Reggans when he asked her why he needed to have a personal guarantee. She said he has to have some "skin in the game." This Court found this comment to be highly insulting. It is not only insulting to a person who has earned his ownership via hard work and profit over a 12 year period, it is insulting based on her explanation that a "personal guarantee shows level of commitment." That's a quote. In the credit world this is a false statement. Every single business person in the world knows what a personal guarantee means. It means the lowest credit rating for a business. It means the business has no value. is why the personal guarantee is required, so that the lender can take your house if the business fails to pay its debts. In this case, it is not true that the

business had no value. Motor's Holding, after its
own due diligence, was prepared to invest 2.5 million
dollars in this business. This casts doubt on the
requirement for a personal guarantee. Page 10

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Most small business people start with a personal guarantee and struggle to escape this risk by building the net worth of their business. For her to say this in court under oath shows her lack of respect for the Court, and her total lack of credibility. But it does reveal her motivation. Clearly, this explanation to the Court and to Mr. Reggans is the first real proof of a GMAC hidden agenda.

Surprisingly, Mr. Pedram Davoudpour did testify credibly. When the Court asked him why these actions were taking place, he candidly indicated that there were "red flags in the file."

When I asked him to identify what he read in the file that was a red flag, he indicated that the letter of July 31st, 2008 was the red flag. Mr. Davoudpour was not using the occurrences of November or December or August to impose the restrictions on ECI that he was responsible for implementing, he was relying on the July letter. Mr. Davoudpour's testimony affirms for the Court that the requirements in the July letter were false targets and were designed to create the

1	basis for ECI's default.
2	The hidden agenda that is taking place here is a
3	working capital assault on ECI designed to manufacture
4	a default.
5	First, a target for cash injection is set that can Page 11

contract.

reasonable.

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See exhibit number 3 where it says "As Page 12

over \$170,000. This pre payment has no basis in the

arbitrary action, which is not commercially

Next is the inventory reduction charged billed at

condition or contract term. This seems to be just an

used, without any stated relation to a specific market	SZ
without indicating what metric in the market is being	72
one in her letter is thinly based "market condition",	23
were purportedly based on ECI's performance, but this	22
Ms. Smith testified that all past credit decisions	TZ
plus 600, an increase of one hundred percent.	70
is increased from Libor plus 300 basis points to Libor	61
exhibit 69, while at the same time the interest rate	8 T
Then the revolving line of credit is suspended,	۷T
reduction charge.	9τ
Then there is the \$10,000 monthly principal	ST
Next is the \$500 audit charge.	74
this meant, she said, "sell more cars."	ΣŢ
reduce inventory. When the Court asked Ms. Smith what	IS
GMAC's goals. ECI is also told that they need to	ττ
is units and that he needs to sell more units to meet	от
Next is a communication to ECI that the break even	6
3 to 1 debt equity ratio.	8
bring ECI into compliance with the policy metric of a	L
either not be reached, or if it is reached, will not	9
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each vehicle is sold or leased, we will faithfully and promptly remit." It comes directly out of working capital without being earned. The calculation of the sum has no metric and appears totally arbitrary. It appears to assume depreciation of a vehicle that is not being used when all depreciation rules are based on use. It is even generally known that you value a car based on mileage used, so this charge appears arbitrary and as such is not commercially reasonable.

Then there is the November refusal to floor unencumbered new and used vehicles at the Dealer's request when it would have had maximum positive effect on the Dealer in response to the Dealer's efforts to be proactive and anticipate his problems.

Followed by that decision is the one in December to allow flooring after audits found ECI to be Out of Trust. This action violated GMAC's own rule as testified by Ms. Smith that no flooring would be done once the floorplan was suspended.

But in the December case, the flooring helps GMAC
by obtaining more of ECI's assets, and harms the
Dealer because only his earlier proactive approach
would have enabled him to avoid the Out of Trust
position.
The three day business day remit rule in this
context is used to assault working capital. When the

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business most needs flexibility, the rule is strictly, if not arbitrarily, enforced. This rule is not a contract term, and it is not uniform among dealers. Some have a five business day remit rule. And there was no testimony in the record concerning how it was applied or who got three and who got five.

If it's not based on contract or a clearly articulated policy, it is arbitrary and not commercially reasonable.

The sales date determined by GMAC is arbitrary. Pedram Davoudpour testified that when there was a dispute about sales dates then they would negotiate it with the Dealer. However, it was clear from the testimony that there would be no negotiating with Mr. Vick or Mr. Ted Modrzejwski. The date is applied in an arbitrary manner because cars are considered sold before the deal closes and is funded. Even known unwinds are included in the audits as due and payable.

This is a working capital assault, because it then
requires the Dealer to fund the GMAC floorplan payment
out of his working capital rather than out of the
sale. A Dealer with a five day remit will have a
distinct advantage here over one who has a three day
remit. And this is not commercially reasonable
because it's not based in any contract term and not on
any clearly articulated policy. Page 14

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Audits taking place on a daily basis also assault working capital. All the employees who testified indicated that the daily audits interfered with their performance. They testified that it reduced sales. Inefficient performance diminishes working capital because employees must be paid who are not achieving peak performance. Mr. Jaffee testified that GMAC was on site interfering with the business operation from November 14th, 2008 until he left on January 28th, 2009. He testified that during this time, "there was not one day when they were not physically on the premises." This is not commercially reasonable behavior. He testified that customers overheard their conversations when they would come into his office and demand information. This testimony is contrary to GMAC witnesses who said they were polite and asked employees to step out. This creates a credibility

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1	question that this Court resolves against GMAC.
2	On December 4th, exhibit 56, demand on the open
3	account was made severely impacting not only working
4	capital, but the Dealer's cash position by diverting
5	and freezing these critical funds.
6	On December 15th GMAC demanded payment on all
7	credit lines with a deadline of March 13th.
В	And then surprisingly, on December 19th, just four
9	days later, GMAC demanded immediate payment of all Page 15

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credit lines referenced in the letter December 15th, 2008. These two actions coming within days of each other do not make sense unless they are intended to stop his investment from Motor's Holding.

On December 30th GMAC acquired a Temporary Restraining Order that shut the business down for two weeks.

Demand notices went to financing institutions and this assault stopped all financing of sales until relief was granted by the Court January 15, 2009.

It is unrebutted that Mr. Reggans had a pre-investment contract, exhibit number 109, in place that would have provided an equity cash injection into his business by Motor's Holding in the amount of 2.5 million dollars and which was due to close on January 9th, 2009. It is unrebutted that Mr. Vick and Ms.

1	Smith of GMAC, and others, knew this contract was
2	pending. With this deal, Mr. Reggans would again be a
3	junior investor in his business. However, it is also
4	undisputed that an equity investment of 2.5 million
5	dollars, just days away, would have solved all of
6	ECI's credit problems with GMAC. Motor's Holding, in
7	its refusal to close, cited this lawsuit as a basis
8	for denial.
9	Okay. So here is my analysis, and this is a
10	quote.

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"The law has not yet acknowledged a general requirement of full disclosure of all relevant facts in all business relationships but the duty to disclose relevant information to contractual party can arise as a result of transaction itself within the partie's general obligation to deal in good faith."

This is from Liebergesell vs. Evans 93 Wash.2d 881. And the quote is from 893. It's a 1980 case.

By failing to disclose the debt to equity ratio and other aspects of GMAC's sophisticated financial analysis, GMAC was able to create a false target for the Dealer and mislead ECI about its future actions.

GMAC withheld information on its true targets and metrics, while at the same time pushing the Dealer to achieve the stated targets by trying to increase

sales, while at the same time deliberately depriving the Dealer of the working capital needed to reach the stated targets and/or goals set for him by GMAC. By so doing, GMAC leads the Dealer to behave in a way that is beneficial to GMAC but detrimental to the Dealer. These facts were never disclosed. These facts were at all times relevant to their relationship and this Court finds that GMAC had a duty to disclose them. As such, failure to disclose these facts constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

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In a slow market there are two ways to break-even and reach a favorable debt to equity ratio. One is to increase sales but the other is to reduce overhead, which will reduce the firm's ability to sell.

Revealing the debt to equity ratio and other parts of the financial analysis could make this determination to reduce possible. To discuss break even analysis only in units and only in increasing unit sales hides this fact. Lower sales in the current climate was not good for GMAC. GMAC pushed the Dealer to perform when he could have reduced his efforts to obtain profitability, but this would have increased his inventory. Ms. Smith testified that he needed to "sell more cars" to succeed. Clearly, in the current

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1 market, with all of his competitors, hers is a specious conclusion. 2 The U.C.C. defines good faith in RCW 62A.9A-102(43) 3 as follows: 4 5 "Good faith means honesty in fact and the observance of a reasonable commercial standards of 6 fair dealing." 7 In the instant case, GMAC did not conduct itself 8 9 honestly. There was a hidden agenda throughout the 10 time from when Mr. Vick took control until the 11 catastrophic demands in December. The goal of the 12 team from GMAC in this case was to shut down the Page 18

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The mechanism was to set a false target that Dealer. could not be achieved and by so doing manufacture a 14 15 default. 16 Given the totality of GMAC's actions, this is the 17 only conclusion this Court can come to. This was a hidden agenda. GMAC does not have a contractual right 18 to shut down the Dealer and put him out of business. 19 20 GMAC may withdraw their financing, but they must do so 21 in a commercially reasonable manner. This was not 22 done in this case. The actions taken by GMAC to 23 assault the Dealer's working capital were designed to 24 put him out of business, not merely to protect 25 collateral. If GMAC had disclosed that it did not

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want to do business with ECI in the future openly and 1 honestly, then he would have had recourse to 2 3 alternatives. But instead the Dealer was led to believe his past good relationship with GMAC still 4 5 existed all the while secret actions were taking place, which damaged his ability to perform, and these 6 7 actions escalated during 2008. In fact, the actions of December 15th and 19th seemed designed to block his 8 9 financing from Motor's Holding, which closing date was 10 less than thirty days away. If he had the fifty days from June 10th to July 11 31st, he may have been able to close that deal despite the efforts of GMAC. Here, GMAC aligned all forces in Page 19

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order to make the Dealer fail. Such actions are not commercially necessary or reasonable. This case is the perennial problem of a false target, otherwise known as "hiding the ball". If ECI had known that it could never achieve the goals GMAC had set, then it would have been free to pursue other options.

Now, GMAC quoted the case of Badgett. I am not going to give the cite. But Badgett is not on point because it deals with an affirmative expansion of a duty of good faith by requiring cooperation. Here no such expansion is contemplated or required. this Court does not require GMAC to cooperate in any

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1 venture. The law only requires GMAC to be honest with 2 regard to its intentions and not attempt to 3 manufacture defaults, put pressure on a business to fail, or block other contract opportunities. All these things were done in this case, and all are acts of bad faith. The Dealer in this case has a right to know how he

is being evaluated. Failure to disclose this amounts to having to take a test without knowing what the problems are to be solved. He was constantly given partial financial information and encouraged to turn his inventory when doing just the opposite would have made him profitable.

14 ECI sold 19 million dollars by October of 2008. Page 20

With these sales, that if he had cut back his sales 15 16 efforts and lowered his break-even point, he could 17 have made a profit, but GMAC was pushing him to do 18 just the opposite in order to engineer default. This 19 constitutes bad faith. So the conclusions of law are that this Court has 20 21 jurisdiction in this matter. 22 GMAC breached the contract by violating the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 23 24 The request for replevin is denied. And I think consistent with that, the motion to 25

1	amend the complaint is also denied.
2	I don't think we need to talk about it.
3	Anybody have anything else they want to say?
4	MR. GLOWNEY: What is the Court going to do with
5	the TRO?
6	THE COURT: Well, I think that means it's over.
7	Mr. Hausmann?
8	MR. HAUSMANN: I agree, I think it was just in
9	place between the time of the inception of the case
10	and this ruling on replevin, so I think it's
11	distinguished by definition.
12	MR. WHEELER: Your Honor
13	MR. GLOWNEY: Is the Court treating this as the
14	final ruling in this case?
15	THE COURT: The Court is treating this as the Page 21

16 final ruling in this case. 17 MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, taking that into consideration, we would request that there be a hold 18 on the bond so that we could pursue monetary damages 19 20 against GMAC on that bond. 21 THE COURT: I will grant that. 22 MR. GLOWNEY: Is that going to be in this case or 23 some different case? 24 THE COURT: I am not sure. 25 MR. GLOWNEY: I'm just trying to understand, if you

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1	are saying that this case is finished, then where is
2	he pursuing this claim?
3	THE COURT: Well, I thought about this to a
4	certain extent, because I know that this matter is
5	going to continue in some form. I am not quite sure
6	how. What I'm going to do is I'm going to retain
7	jurisdiction in this case for any post hearing motions
8	that relate to this replevin action.
9	And if you think that the bond relates to that, go
10	ahead and make your motion.
11	MR. HAUSMANN: Your Honor, I think just to for
12	interest of full explanation we do have a counterclaim
13	pending, and it has a claim for damages.
14	And I just don't I am not I'm still
15	processing your decision, I am not sure how we should
16	approach that issue through here. Page 22

17 THE COURT: The rest of the trial? MR. HAUSMANN: Yes, well you just mentioned this 18 19 was a final decision. 20 THE COURT: On the replevin motion. 21 MR. WHEELER: So should we file a motion for -- as 22 for readiness to proceed against the bond for the monetary damages on the counterclaim? 23 24 THE COURT: I am not quite sure I understand that 25 either.

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1	MR. WHEELER: We have a counterclaim against GMAC
2	for monetary damages. The bond was submitted by GMAC
3	so that in the event the replevin action was decided
4	against GMAC ~-
5	THE COURT: Oh, is it a replevin bond?
6	MR. HAUSMANN: It is a replevin bond.
7	MR. GLOWNEY: It is.
8	MR. WHEELER: It is. So in the event that that
9	decision was rendered against GMAC and the Dealer
10	could prove damages, the Dealer could pursue a claim
11	against that bond.
12	THE COURT: I'm just doing this off the top of my
13	head, I hadn't thought about this part. I would
14	expect that would be the second step of this action,
15	the proceeding against the bond.
16	MR. GLOWNEY: Wouldn't it be a trial on monetary
17	damages? I don't quite understand what proceeding Page 23

18 against the bond is --19 THE COURT: Well, the bond is replevin bond and 20 the decision on the replevin has been made. 21 MR. HAUSMANN: Just to confuse things a little bit more. The first action was an injunction. What GMAC 22 filed was a replevin bond before Judge Allendoerfer. 23 24 We argued that was not the right type of bond. Allendoerfer said it's a bond, it's sufficient. 25 1

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don't want to paraphrase what he said, but arguably he 1 said that was a bond to insure from damages that 2 flowed from the injunction, which I think might be a 3 different species of damages or species of claim, than 4 5 a replevin bond and the damages related to the 6 replevin. 7 THE COURT: Okay. What I contemplated was that there was this replevin show cause action and then 8 once the decision was made here, then the other issue 9 10 would proceed to trial. 11 MR. HAUSMANN: Okay. 12 THE COURT: That's what I contemplated. 13 MR. HAUSMANN: Right. 14 THE COURT: But there might be some -- what I was thinking about last night, is there may be need in 15 going from that step to the trial, there may be some 16 need for other types of motions, depending on the 17 18 ruling of this hearing, to facilitate a smooth Page 24

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transition. And off on the top of my head, I couldn't think of anything, but that might have been because it was 3:30 in the morning and I couldn't process all that well then.

But I think that there are probably some things that probably need to be done, so I will retain jurisdiction for the post hearing motions. I will not

1	retain jurisdiction for the trial, that has to go back
2	to presiding to be assigned out for trial. And that
3	trial will be on damages.
4	MR. GLOWNEY: So the injunction is lifted?
5	THE COURT: The injunction is lifted.
6	MR. GLOWNEY: So when they sell cars what do they
7	do?
8	MR. HAUSMANN: They are still contractually bound.
9	MR. WHEELER: We will pay the floorplan amount.
10	MR. GLOWNEY: Then we have \$700,000 in
11	delinquencies.
12	MR. WHEELER: The delinquencies were caused as a
13	result of your action.
14	MR. GLOWNEY: And the 130 under the TRO, we don't
15	need to debate that here, but that's a question.
1 6	THE COURT: I understand that is not a neat and
17	tidy situation, okay. But I can't resolve all the
18	problems at this point.
19	MR. GLOWNEY: I just want to be clear, the Page 25

injunction is lifted or not.

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21	THE COURT: It is lifted.
22	MR. HAUSMANN: Thank you, your Honor.
23	MR. WHEELER: Thank you, your Honor.
24	THE COURT: So I'm not quite sure what you all
25	want to do in terms of an order, but in an hour I'm
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1	going to be heading over to juvenile court.
2	Mr. Hausmann, you know where juvenile court is.
3	MR. HAUSMANN: Yes.
4	THE COURT: If you need me to sign something today,
5	I will be available over there.
6	MR. WHEELER: Yes, we do.
7	THE COURT: You just need to go over there and
8	speak with the court coordinator.
9	MR. HAUSMANN: That's down at Denny.
10	THE COURT: Have you been there lately? Just go
11	in the main front entrance, once you go through the
12	metal detector and all that, there is a little booth.
13	MR. HAUSMANN: Kiosk.
14	THE COURT: Yes, kiosk, and just ask them. I will
15	either be in courtroom one after three o'clock, or I
16	will be upstairs in staffing.

do you want me to --

MR. GLOWNEY: Are you going to prepare an order or

MR. GLOWNEY: We need to get it entered today.

MR. HAUSMANN: We will work together.

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21	THE COURT: Anything else?
22	MR. GLOWNEY: I don't think so.
.23	THE COURT: Thank you. Court will be in recess.
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25	